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ABSTRACT 
This article explores how the quality of institutions influences the strategic choice  of agents in the pulp 
and paper production system based on the forest plantation sector. In order to proceed with the study, 
we employ the Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Barzel, 1982, 1989, 2002) as foundation, and test 
the proposition: in federative states where the institutional environment is fragile and therefore the State 
has a high cost to enforce property rights, private mechanisms stand out in the protection of property 
rights. According to Dixit (2009, p. 8), “if the government does not pro tect property rights, at least not as 
well as owners require, many private arrangements arise to satisfy the owners' needs”. The analysis of 
three business cases of companies with plantations in more than one federative unit revealed the broad 
range of private mechanisms in place to cope with insecure land rights. In addition to countrywide 
strategies, in the federative units where government fails to be a good property rights steward, we found 
geographically specific initiatives being used. Another finding was the identification of variables that are 
able to evaluate the quality of institutions and employed in the companies´ decision -making process for 
the selection of land rights protection strategies. Findings altogether are empirical evidence of how the 
quality of institutions influences the strategic choice of land rights protection in the forest plantation 
sector in Brazil. 
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1 Introduction 
The beginning of the years 2000 in the Extreme South of Bahia was marked by a peak of agrarian 
conflicts, permeated by dispute and violence. On the one hand, social movements occupying farms 
of forest enterprises; and on the other hand, private organizations seeking protection under the 
justice system. Adjudication was followed by enforcement of repossession mandates by the public 
security forces, which often turned into violent episodes (Araújo, 2010). The forest companies 
Fibria and Veracel reported in their 2011 sustainability reports the escalation of farm invasions in 
the State of Bahia and the beginning of a journey to settle land disputes other than through 
litigation (Fibria, 2012, 2013, 2014, Veracel, 2012, 2013, 2014). Such positioning on the part of 
companies raised a question: what are the strategies deployed by forest plantation companies to 
protect land rights?   
To the Economic Analysis of Property Rights Theory, the enforcement of agreements is a basic 
feature of the state (Barzel, 2002). In order to create enabling conditions for transactions, it first 
defines the scope of rights to be protected through legislation. Secondly, it employs specialized 
structure such as justice courts and security forces to enforce regulations.  However, there are 
circumstances where the state fails to be a good property right steward or refrains from its role. 
The same theory predicts the consequences of such fact.   
In Brazil, the historical colonization process plus the formation of a legal framework have put in 
place a fragile land governance system (Reydon, 2007, 2011a, 2014; Silva, 1997; The World Bank 
LAC, 2014), which attenuates the state’s capacity to protect land rights. The vulnerabilities create a 
favorable condition to numerous land conflicts (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2018) with social 
implications (Alston, Harris, & Mueller, 2009; Alston, Libecap, & Mueller, 2000), environmental 
implications, such as deforestation (Alston et al., 2000; Araujo, Bonjean, Combes, Combes Motel, & 
Reis, 2009; Reydon, 2011b; Robinson, Holland, & Naughton-Treves, 2014; Zylbersztajn, 2010) and 
economic implications (Nascimento, Saes, & Zylbersztajn, 2010). 
This paper explores the implications within firms. It responds the question: how does the quality of 
institutions influence the strategic choice for the protection of land rights by the forest plantation 
sector in Brazil? 
The focus on the planted forest sector is justified by its economic importance, since it represented 
6.2% of Brazil’s Gross Revenue in 2016 (Indústria Brasileira de Árvores, 2017). In addition, its 
geographic distribution makes possible a comparison across the federative units. Finally, the 
numerous papers about land acquisition by companies and land disputes with local communities 
are extra motivation to study the case under a theoretical lens.  
The paper encompasses four sessions, besides this introduction. The first session lays the 
theoretical foundation to the proposition raised in the paper.  The second session presents the 
methodology for data collection and analysis. The third one outlines empirical findings and 
confront them with the theoretical proposition. The forth session concludes the paper.  
2 Theoretical background and proposition 
Why does the state fail to be a good property rights steward? To Barzel (2002), the state has  
comparative advantage in protecting rights over standardized goods, whose contracts can be used 
repeatedly within a territory. However, as size increases, at some point  the magnitude of the effect 
of the diseconomies become the same as that of the effect of the economies. As a consequence, it 
becomes expensive to enforce contracts by making use of legal mechanisms. The more expensive it 
is to make and enforce contracts via formal institutions, the more will people use dispute-resolving 
mechanisms that are substitutes for the state, who can itself create such substitute operation 
(Barzel, 2002).  
Dixit (2004) also arguments that the high cost of legal mechanisms prevents their use and explores 
other sources of costs. The time to obtain a judicial decision, the undervaluation of losses by 
employing underestimated interest rates, the difficulty in taking into account all factors, the 
difficult-to-predict court decisions, the disclosure of confidential information and the courts 
difficulty in verifying contractual conditions are all reasons for the high cost of  legal protection. 
The same two authors discuss the consequences of the state´s limited capacity to be a good 
property rights steward. According to them, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or 
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alternative economic governance mechanisms fill the gap (Barzel, 2002; Dixit, 2004). One sort of 
alternative mechanism is the close-knit groups, such as religious groups, who enforce their rules by 
threatening expulsion. Another sort is vertically integrated organizations who are able to avoid 
disputes by transforming transactors in not fully residual claimants to their own organizations, 
therefore less likely to dispute not-well-defined attributes. A third sort is the trade organizat ions 
who promote enforcement by publicizing non-compliance and by expelling. Criminal organizations 
can enforce agreements that the state prohibits by making use of arms.   
Some examples of alternative economic governance mechanisms explored by Dixit (2004) are: 
economic governance based on relationship, economic governance based on the provision of 
service by a third party specialized in contract enforcement and private property rights prote ction. 
The gain from repetitive transactions and the reputational capital allow contracts to be self -
enforced in an economic governance based on the relationship. In parallel, an organization may 
become specialized in collecting and disseminating information about transactors´ behavior, such 
as credit cooperatives. By frequently being an intermediary organization, it establishes a long -term 
relationship with both parties involved in a transaction, irrespective of the frequency with which 
the transactors meet with each other, being therefore able to enforce contracts. Finally, a private 
owner can take actions to prevent, detect or punish individuals who break the rules, i.e. having 
security patrols who prevent thieves from violating private property.  
Monteiro & Zylbersztajn (2012) developed a model to explain the adoption of three strategies for 
the protection of property rights based on the quality of the institutional environment: strategy 
focused on the legal system (L), on the establishment of private mechanisms (P), and on the 
abandonment of valuable attributes on public domain (figure 1). L and P cost curves are functions 
of capture efficacy vis-à-vis protection effort (σ) and a group of shifter parameters (ѡ). In a sound 
institutional environment (I1), the protection of rights via legal mechanisms is provided by the 
State at a low cost, therefore it is the preferred protection mechanism. In a poor institutional 
environment (I2), the effectiveness of protection by the State is low; for example, it is marked by 
dubious or slow court judgments, and consequently the cost of the legal mechanism increases 
more rapidly than the private mechanism, which then becomes the preferred mechanism for rights 
protection (the most efficient mechanism at the lowest cost). However, there is a maximum 
protection cost that firms can bear (c ̅). Beyond the tipping point, the right owner opts to leave the 
right unprotected 
 
Figure 1. Efficacy of capture effort vis-à-vis protection effort. Source: Monteiro & Zylbersztajn (2012) 
Based on the rational proposed by Monteiro & Zylbersztajn (2012), the following proposition was 
outlined: in federative states where the institutional environment is fragile and therefore the state 
has a high cost to enforce property rights, private mechanisms stand out in the protection of 
property rights. The proposition was then confronted with empirical evidence from three study 
cases in order to comprehend the connection between the quality of institutions and the use of 
private mechanisms to protect land rights.  
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3 Methodology 
The quality of institutions was built on the analysis of publicly available indicators and information. 
The identification of strategies to protect land property rights and of variables able to evaluate the 
quality of institutions employed by companies were built on the content analysis of the interviews 
with executives from three forest plantation companies and on the analysis of internal documents. 
Conclusions were drawn on the confrontation between federative units with greatest evidence of 
vulnerable institutional environment and geographically specific initiatives.   
3.1 Analysis of quality of institutions  
Eleven indicators1 were used to analyze the quality of institutions at a federative unit level: Number 
of properties registered with the land governance system called Sistema de Gestão Fundiária 
(SIGEF) in July 2018; Territorial extension in hectares of the area registered with SIGEF in July 2018;  
Percentage of state surface registered with SIGEF in July 2018; Number of Indigenous communities 
with land traditionally occupied in stages prior to the regularized condition in June 2018; Number 
of indigenous communities with land traditionally occupied in stages prior to the regularized 
condition in June 2018 per 10,000 hectares; Number of filled cases for demarcation of quilombola 2 
land by June 2018; Number of filled cases for demarcation of quilombola land by June  2018 per 
10,000 hectares; Number of land conflicts in 2017; Number of land conflicts in 2017 per 10,000 
hectares; Percentage of rural population in 2010; and Human Development Index (HDI) in 2010.  
Federative units’ performance was compared based on indicators. The three most critical ones 
were highlighted. A score representing the number of times each federative unit has been 
highlighted was created. The higher the score, the greater the evidence of fragility of the 
institutional environment in the given federative unit.   
3.2 Selection of three business cases 
The criteria for selecting business cases were: (i) size of owned commercial plantations and natural 
vegetation conservation areas; and (ii) frequency with which the company is associated with land 
conflicts in the literature review. 
According to information compiled by the consulting company Consulfor in March 2018, Fibria and 
Suzano were the largest planted forest companies in Brazil, holding more than 500 thousand 
hectares each. Jari occupied the twelfth position. 
Papers for literature review were retrieved from the Web of Knowledge database in January 2018, 
related to publications from 2001 to 2017, using the key words: land conflict, land tenure, land 
rights, forest companies, forest sector, paper industry and Brazil. Nine publications were reviewed. 
The criteria for classification by citation frequency were: high when the company’s name was 
mentioned in six or more papers; average, when mentioned in three to five papers; and low when 
mentioned in one or two papers; and absent from the literature review when the company’s name 
was not cited in any paper. 
The top two forest plantation companies, Fibria and Suzano Paper and Pulp, were the ones with 
high citation frequency. Despite the fact that Jari Pulp had a low citation rate and was the twelfth 
largest forest cultivator in Brazil, it has been selected for the study case because of the length of 
time that its land regularization process has been taking.  
3.3 Identification of strategies to protect land rights and variables for decision making 
Ten key-informants from the three forest companies were interviewed using semi -structured 
questionnaires, between January and June 2018. A content analysis has followed. Nine  categories 3 
were used to identify and classify strategies for land rights protection. The initial category list was 
based on alternative conflict resolution mechanisms studied by Barzel (2002) and alternative 
economic governance mechanisms listed by Dixit (2004). It was then complemented with 
categories that emerged from the interviews. Eleven categories4 were proposed for the 
                                                 
1 Sources of information are available in the appendix  
2 Afro descendent community 
3 Categories for classification of strategies for the protection of land rights are available in appendix B 
4 Categories for classification of variables employed in the strategic decision-making process are available in 
appendix C 
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classification of variables employed in the strategic decision-making process. They were based on 
the review of transcribed interviews.  According to the content analysis technique, the most 
significant themes are the ones more frequently included in the discourse (Bardin, 2016).  
Initiatives not employed in all federative units where the company has operations were classified as 
geographically specific. The states in which such initiatives have been implemented were compared 
against the ones with higher institutional environment score.  
4 Empirical findings 
4.1 The quality of the institutions at federative unit level 
The quality of institutions in twelve federative units with forest plantations revealed that 
Maranhão is the one with greatest evidence of institutional fragility regarding land rights 
protection, since it scores 6 points. The second position is occupied by Pará with a score of 5 
points. Espírito Santo, Piauí and Rio de Janeiro share the third position with 4 points each. In the 
fourth position are Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul with 3 points each. In the fifth place come Amapá 
and Mato Grosso do Sul with 2 points each.  
Minas Gerais and São Paulo come in the sixth position with 1 point each. They are the top two 
states with the largest forest plantation area in Brazil (Serviço Florestal Brasileiro, 2017). 
Tocantins is the state with the best institutional quality performance, since it scored zero within 
the group of indicators. 
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Table 1. 
Analysis of the quality of institutions in twelve federative units 
Federative unit/Indicator AP BA ES MA MG MS PA PI RJ RS SP TO 
Number of properties registered with SIGEF in July 
2018 (in thousands plots) 
0.558 16.34 2.67 13.5 55.388 24.419 9.27 4.79 2.005 22.841 53.664 17.67 
Territorial extension in hectares of the area 
registered with SIGEF in July 2018 
4.7 8.706 0.352 7.82 11.079 11.391 16.07 3.21 0.337 3.752 4.56 10.45 
Percentage of state surface registered with SIGEF in 
July 2018 
33% 15% 8% 24% 19% 32% 13% 13% 8% 13% 18% 38% 
Number of Indigenous communities with land 
traditionally occupied in stages prior to the 
regularized condition in June 2018 
1 13 0 7 6 34 26 0 3 28 20 3 
Number of indigenous communities with land 
traditionally occupied in stages prior to the 
regularized condition in June 2018 per 10,000 
hectares 
0.07 0.23 0 0.21 0.1 0.95 0.21 0 0.69 0.99 0.81 0.11 
Number of filled cases for demarcation of 
quilombola land by June 2018 
33 292 19 339 232 18 48 65 25 96 51 33 
Number of filled cases for demarcation of 
quilombola land by June 2018 per 10,000 hectares 
2.31 5.17 4.12 10.21 3.96 0.5 0.38 2.58 5.71 3.41 2.05 1.19 
Number of land conflicts in 2017 45 97 9 180 38 32 67 14 7 7 34 28 
Number of land conflicts in 2017 per 10,000 hectares 
3.15 1.72 1.95 5.42 0.65 0.9 0.54 0.56 1.6 0.25 1.37 1.01 
Percentage of rural population in 2010 10.22 27.9 16.6 36.9 14.7 14.36 31.5 34.2 3.28 14.9 4 21.2 
HDI in 2010 0.708 0.66 0.74 0.639 0.731 0.729 0.646 0.646 0.761 0.746 0.783 0.699 
Score  2 3 4 6 1 2 5 4 4 3 1 0 
Carolina Torres Graça and Decio Zylbersztajn./ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 10 (5), 2019, 516-529 
522 
4.2 Strategies for protecting land rights 
Nine strategies are used by the three companies to protect land rights (Table 2).  
Table 2. 
Strategies for protecting property rights over land 
Fibria Jari Suzano
Strategy Citations Strategy Citations Strategy Citations
Stakeholders relationship 22
Use of legal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution
21 Stakeholders relationship 22
Land title regularity 15 Stakeholders relationship 19
Use of legal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution
11
Support to agricultural production 
and income generation 
alternatives in rural areas
10 Land title regularity 15
Assessment of socio-
environmental, land and legal 
compliance risks associated with 
the asset
10
Multi stakeholders agreement 9
Support to agricultural production 
and income generation 
alternatives in rural areas
13 Negotiation of property rights 7
Negotiation of property rights 8 Multi stakeholders agreement 12 Multi stakeholders agreement 7
Use of legal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution
7 Negotiation of property rights 10 Land title regularity 6
Assessment of socio-
environmental, land and legal 
compliance risks associated with 
the asset
6 Asset protection and patrolling 7
Support to agricultural production 
and income generation 
alternatives in rural areas
5
Territorial planning and 
improvement in asset 
management
5 Asset protection and patrolling 3
 
Stakeholder relationship is the most relevant strategy for protecting land rights, since it was top 
ranked for two companies and ranked second for another one. The continuous interaction between 
the company and the local community allow the identification of disputes in their roots and before 
the conflict escalates. Most cases are solved through direct interaction between the parties for 
clarification or definition of land rights.  
The Use of legal mechanisms and Land title regularity were among the three main strategies for 
two companies. Despite the effort to align land property rights by using stakeholder relationship, 
this is not always achieved, and therefore, property invasion or claiming of land rights by third 
parties are quite frequent in the country. Hence, disputes are brought to justice courts for 
ownership clarification and enforcement. Besides that, in Brazil, there are many land registers and 
cadasters in place that are managed by various institutions: notary, land institute, environmental 
agency, and treasure department, among others. The more the legal documentation converges, the 
more effective is the enforcement of rights by the State. However, not unfrequently, records are 
inconsistent or incomplete, which reduces the leverage of legal protection. Therefore, companies 
aim to obtain Land title regularity. In case of litigation, land titles and registers can be used as 
evidence of tenure and ownership.  
Support to agricultural production and income generation alternatives in rural areas comes in the 
third place, since it appears in the third, fourth and seventh positions in the ranks according to the 
organizations. Forest plantations are located near rural communities who have limited access to 
agriculture technology. In those groups, rural development is an opportunity and some companies 
support agriculture production by providing technical assistance and/or access to credit.  
Both Negotiation about property rights and Multi-stakeholders agreement are at an intermediary 
level of importance. One possible explanation for their restricted use is the implication (deduction) 
over the company's assets. One asset may have various attributes, and consequently, va rious rights 
associated to it (Barzel, 1997). This fact is particularly true for land assets. Beyond the right to 
cultivate the land, there are also the rights to use natural forest and water resources, to access 
places of special interest, such as religious places and cemeteries, among others. Also, land records 
and measurement were not as precise in the past as they are today. Imprecision is the root cause 
of conflicts between owners about boundaries location, size, over lap, title duplication, etc. 
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Therefore, direct negotiation about use, tenure and ownership rights is quite common between the 
parties, including forest companies. However, the participation of third parties is sometimes a 
requirement to ensure formality, to ensure that minority rights be uphold, to provide credible 
information, and to serve as a moderator, among other reasons.  The agreements with the 
participation of three or more organizations, with rights and obligations of signatories about land 
use, tenure and ownership are called multi-stakeholders agreements.  
The Assessment of the socio-environmental, land and legal compliance risks associated with the 
asset also appears at an intermediary level of importance for two companies. It consists of 
gathering information by various company departments before the acquisition of the land to 
prevent the purchase or rental of properties whose characteristics are not suitable for the 
cultivation of forests or whose rights are not clearly defined.   
Asset protection and patrolling mentioned by two companies and with a small number of citations, 
and Territorial planning and improvement in asset management, employed by only one 
organization, are at the bottom of strategy rankings. Asset owners are legally allowed to take 
action to protect their property. In the case of forest companies, they undertake efforts to protect 
the private farms from invasion or unauthorized use by third parties, including security patrolling 
(Asset protection and patrolling). In addition, geospatial technology is a good ally to support the 
management of huge extensions of forest plantation. The geo information is used to plan and 
manage land use. Along with other information, it is possible to have a clear visibility of the 
landscape, which is useful for understanding conflicts over the use of resources (Territorial 
planning and improvement in asset management). 
The number of strategy citations by companies was converted into percentage by using the total 
number of citations per organization. The objective was to compare the relative importance of 
strategy across companies. Percentages obtained were then included in pie charts (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Comparative importance of land rights protection mechanisms by company. Source: the authors 
 
facts call attention in Figure 2. First and as already discussed, the relevance of Stakeholders 
relationship. Second, the relevance of Use of legal mechanisms and land title regularity for Jari and 
Suzano. Third, the similarity in the relative importance of strategies between Fibria and Jari, 
particularly among the first five strategies on the list.  
4.3 The quality of institutions at a federative unit level versus the strategies for land rights  
 protection 
According to the proposition raised in this paper, in federative units where the institutional 
environment is fragile and the state faces high cost to provide enforcement, private mechanisms 
stand out in the protection of property rights. In order to confront the theoretical proposition with 
empirical data, Table 3 presents the federative units with forest plantations with greatest evidence 
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of institutional environment fragility by business case5, number of geographically specific or 
intensified initiatives in those federative units, and total number of strategies for land rights 
protection mentioned by company. 
Table 3. 
Federative units with greatest evidence of institutional environment fragility in the protection of land rights and 
strategies for land rights protection 
Jari
Federative units with greatest 
evidence of vulnerable institutional 
environment
BA ES PA MA BA ES PI
Number of geographically specific or 
intensified initiatives  
2 3 4 6 5 2 0
Number of strategies for land rights 
protection identified in the business 
case
7
Fibria Suzano
8 8
 
 
The federative units with Fibria’s forest plantations with greatest evidence of vulnerable 
institutional environment are Bahia and Espírito Santo. In three out of eight strategies for land 
rights protection there were geographically specific or intensified initiatives in Espírito Santo a nd 
two in Bahia. Within the Stakeholder relationship strategy, the cooperation agreement with 
indigenous communities signed in 2017 and the discussion forum about land rights of afro 
descendent communities (quilombola) have been implemented only in the State of Espírito Santo. 
Within the strategy Support to agricultural production and income generation alternatives in the 
rural environment, the family farming program called Rural Territorial Development Program was 
first launched in Bahia in 2010, followed by subsequent expansion to other units. In December 
2018, it assisted 3,685 families in Bahia, 2,302 families in Mato Grosso do Sul, 1,600 in São Paulo 
and 1,088 in Espírito Santo. However, the company points out that such initiative is part of its 
engagement strategy, regardless of the presence of land conflicts.  Within the Multi -stakeholder 
agreement strategy, it was in Bahia where the first and largest agreement was made between 
social movements and the state government for the creation of rural settlem ents, followed by a 
massive social investment on the part of the company. A similar agreement was under discussion 
between Fibria, the state government and landless movements in Espírito Santo in 2018. Finally, 
within the strategy of Negotiation about property rights in the northern Espírito Santo, land was 
leased to quilombola communities while waiting for the definition of territory boundaries.  
In addition to Bahia and Espírito Santo, the company has made a commitment with the Minas 
Gerais state government and social movements to give preference to the agrarian reform program 
when offering land for sale.  
Pará is the federative unit having Jari’s forest plantations that has greatest evidence of institutional 
fragility. In four out of seven strategies for land rights protection there were geographically specific 
or intensified initiatives in that state. Within the strategy of Use of legal mechanisms to resolve 
disputes, the use of legal adjunction between 2009 and 2011 was reported to solve frequent land 
invasions within that period. Land regularization is under way both in the States of Para and 
Amapá, but efforts are greater in Pará. In this location, there is an agreement in place with various 
state government bodies to promote land regularization in the Jari Valley region (Multi-stakeholder 
agreement strategy), followed by Land rights negotiation.  
Federative units having Suzano’s forest plantations with greatest evidence of institutional 
environment vulnerability are Maranhão, Bahia, Espírito Santo and Piauí. In six out of eight 
strategies for land rights protection there were geographically specific or intensified initiatives in 
Maranhão, five in Bahia and two in Espírito Santo. However, there was no initiative in Piauí. Within 
the stakeholder relationship strategy, in Maranhão and Bahia the company has been engaging with 
rural settlement groups, with the assistance of a group of outsourced experts. In Maranhão, the 
                                                 
5 In the individual business case, only the federative units with forest plantations of the given organization were 
compared across each other. This is the reason why most vulnerable units in Table 3 do not necessarily follow the 
same order as Table 1. 
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company has been contributing to the improvement of the land governance system promoted by 
local authorities, since a good land rights definition is a requirement for Using legal mechanisms to 
resolve land disputes. In Maranhão and Bahia there are two internal Land Working Groups under 
operation. Their role is to deliberate about socio-environmental and non-compliance risks 
associated to properties under consideration for purchase and rental (under the strategy of 
Assessment of socio-environmental, land and non-compliance risk associated to the property). 
Nevertheless, it´s important to note two caveats. First, the Working Groups are not restricted to 
land acquisition in these two states. Pulp mills in Bahia and Maranhão procure wood from 
neighboring states. The second caveat is that the company's growth strategy, which can also 
condition the existence of such Groups, was not in the scope of this study. 
One type of multi-stakeholder agreement is found only in Maranhão and Bahia, compared to other 
federative units with Suzano´s forest plantation.  uzano has been signatory of the Agreement for 
Mitigation of Land Conflicts in the Extreme South of Bahia since 2015. According to the agreement, 
some private farms were to be expropriated and transformed into rural settlements by the 
government in 2018. The forest company was committed to provide support to  settlers. A similar 
commitment is in place in Maranhão. Former company’s farms were turned into rural settlements 
and technical assistance was being provided to farmers. 
The number of Local Development Councils is higher in Bahia and Maranhão. Nine of them are 
located in Bahia and another nine in Maranhão, against three in Pará, three in Espírito Santo, two 
in Tocantins and one in Minas Gerais. The Council´s objective is to assign to a multi -stakeholder 
group the responsibilities to foster local development. Among various topics, opportunities for land 
leasing in favor of communities are discussed within the group. 
Under the strategy Support to agricultural production and income generation in rural areas, in 
Maranhão, the company has a cooperation agreement with Babassu Coconut Cracker Association 
for fruit collection within the company’s farms. Besides that, in Espírito Santo, the company has 
implemented employment and income initiatives dedicated to the quilombola community. 
In northern Espírito Santo, Suzano has employed an unusual procedure to ensure Land titles 
regularity. It contacted the local Land Institute and the Public Archive to trace back the origin of its 
land titles and assess their quality, given the absence of a  centralized credible database. 
Finally, the Asset Intelligence Department was first created in Bahia and the Procedure with Criteria 
and Guidelines for Land Conflicts Resolution was firstly implemented in Maranhão, and both were 
later extended to other states.  Both initiatives belong to the Asset protection and patrolling 
strategy. 
The absence of initiatives in Piauí calls attention to a situation where the adoption of private 
protection mechanisms was, apparently, different from the proposition outlined in this paper. This 
fact suggests that (i) other variables should be added to the model that explains the adoption of 
private mechanisms for the protection of property rights, besides the quality of institutions, such as 
asset value; (ii) the company´s strategic interest in the location should be also taken into 
consideration.  The last point (ii) reflects what Monteiro and Zylbersztajn (2012) called the 
maximum cost threshold for property rights protection ( ) that economic agents are able to bear. 
Once this tipping point is reached, attributes are abandoned in the public domain due to the 
extremely adverse environmental conditions. 
It is interesting to note that, in the three business cases, multi -stakeholder platforms to cope with 
land rights were found in the federative units with greatest evidence of fragility in the institutional 
environment, except for Piauí.  
4.4 Variables included in the decision-making process  
The multitude of mechanisms for land rights protection raises the interest in the criteria for 
selecting when to use each option. The empirical study revealed six variables that are used by 
companies to decide on land rights protection strategy (Table 4).  
Carolina Torres Graça and Decio Zylbersztajn./ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 10 (5), 2019, 516-529 
526 
Table 4 
Variables for selecting a strategy for protecting land rights 
Variable Citations Variable Citations Variable Citations
Claim legitimacy 10 Claim legitimacy 10 Claim legitimacy 15
Case complexity 7 Case complexity 10 Openness to dialogue 13
Openness to dialogue 6
Size of the area under 
dispute
4 Case complexity 9
Leverage of legal property 
rights
6
Leverage of legal property 
rights
7
Number of people involved 
in the dispute
6
Number of people involved 
in the dispute
3
Size of the area under 
dispute
3
Size of the area under 
dispute
3
Fibria SuzanoJari
 
 
The most relevant variable for a strategic decision is Claim legitimacy, since it was top ranked by 
the three companies. Case complexity comes in second place and Openness to dialogue in third 
place, as both are among the top three variables for all companies. The fourth variable is Lever age 
of legal property rights. At the bottom of the ranking are Number of people involved in the dispute 
and Size of the area under dispute. 
Claim legitimacy, Case complexity and Level of legal property rights security are variables 
connected to the institutional environment. Land possession and claiming used to be a common 
practice in all regions in Brazil since the colonial time. Often, the factual land occupation was not 
formalized in the land titles. Due to this fact, inconsistencies among land tenure, u se and 
ownership are common in Brazil (Case complexity), justifying the legitimacy of the claims. If there 
were a sound institutional environment, such situations would not be allowed (Monteiro & 
Zylbersztajn, 2012) and legal property rights would be in accordance with the field situation, and 
consequently, no questioning would be made on the Leverage of legal property rights. Therefore, 
the three variables capture the quality of institutions and, consequently, the transaction cost to 
protect land rights through formal mechanisms.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper revealed the wide range of mechanisms for land rights protection employed by three 
planted forest companies in Brazil and their order of importance according to executives´ 
perception. The nine strategies are in line with Barzel (2002) and Dixit´s (2004) predictions about 
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the economic governance system to 
overcome the high cost associated to legal protection mechanisms.  
At the top of nationwide mechanisms in the federative states where the institutional environment 
has greatest evidence of fragility, geographically specific or intensified initiatives are in place; 
among them and in all cases, multi-stakeholder platforms were being used. This finding is in 
accordance with the framework developed by Monteiro & Zylbersztajn (2012) and with the 
proposition raised in this paper. However, it is important to notice that in one federative unit, 
result was different from what was expected, which raises the need for additional studies.  
An additional finding was the identification of three variables that allow companies to evaluate the 
quality of institutional at federative unit level and to estimate the cost for right protection through 
formal mechanisms.  
In summary, the quality of the institutions: (i) is considered in the strategic decision-making process 
for the protection of property rights; (ii) determines the transaction cost for the protection of 
property rights through formal mechanisms; and (iii) determines the importance of private 
mechanisms for land rights protection.  
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Results are important to both private and public organizations. Companies may use the strategies 
and variables here outlined to improve investment and conflict resolution and decision -making 
processes. The findings are also valuable to evidence how land conflicts are dealt with above and 
beyond litigation. In addition, the paper highlights the importance of a sound institutional 
environment to reduce transaction cost for land rights protection. Government bodies willing t o 
attract investment and at the same time protect minorities´ land rights, should pursue 
improvement in the definition and enforcement of legal property rights.  
References 
Alston, L. J., Harris, E., and Mueller, B. (2009). De facto and de jure property rights: Land settlement and 
land conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. frontiers. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1474025 
Alston, L. J., Libecap, G., and Mueller, B. (2000). Land reform policies, the sources of violent conflict, and 
implications for deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 39(2): 162–188. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1999.1103 
Araujo, C., Bonjean, C. A., Combes, J. L., Combes Motel, P., and Reis, E. J. (2009). Property rights and 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Ecological Economics, 68(8–9): 2461–2468. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.12.015 
Araújo, M. N. R. de. (2010). Luta pela terra na região extremo sul da Bahia/Brasil: Um estudo da 
espacialização e territorialização do movimento dos trabalhadores rurais sem-terra (1985-2005). In 
VIII Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología Rural: 1–20. Porto de Galinhas. 
Bardin, L. (2016). Análise de Conteúdo. (L. A. Reto & A. Pinheiro, Trans.). São Paulo: Edições 70. 
Barzel, Y. (1997). Economic analysis of property rights (2a. edição). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Barzel, Y. (2002). The theory of the state Economic rights, legal rights and the scope of the state. Nova 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra. (2018). Área em conflito. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from 
https://www.cptnacional.org.br/component/jdownloads/category/4-areas-em-conflito?limitstart=0 
Dixit, A. (2004). Lawlessness and economics alternative modes of governance. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Fibria. (2012). Relatório de sustentabilidade 2011. São Paulo. Retrieved from 
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2011/pt/ 
Fibria. (2013). Relatório de sustentabilidade 2012. São Paulo. Retrieved from 
http://www.fibria.com.br/r2014/ 
Fibria. (2014). Relatório de 2013 Firmes no rumo. São Paulo. Retrieved from 
http://www.fibria.com.br/relatorio2013/ 
Indústria Brasileira de Árvores. (2017). Relatório 2017. Retrieved from 
http://iba.org/images/shared/Biblioteca/IBA_RelatorioAnual2017.pdf 
Monteiro, G. F. de A. M., Zylbersztajn, D. (2012). The Institutional Foundations of Property Rights 
Strategies. In Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institucional Economics. Los 
Angeles. Retrieved from http://papers.sioe.org/losangeles.html 
Nascimento, V. E. de S., Saes, M. S. M., and Zylbersztajn, D. (2010). Direitos de propriedade, 
investimentos e conflitos de terra no brasil : uma análise da experiência paranaense. Revista de 
Economia e Sociologia Rural, 48. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0103-
20032010000300010 
Reydon, B. P. (2007). A regulação institucional da propriedade da terra no Brasil: Uma necessidade 
urgente. E-Premissas Revista de Estudos Estratégicos, 2(janeiro/junho): 25–60. 
Reydon, B. P. (2011a). A questão agrária brasileira requer solução no século XXI. In As questões agrária e 
da infraestrutura de transporte para o agronegócio: 3–48. Viçosa: Universidade Federal de Viçosa. 
Reydon, B. P. (2011b). O desmatamento da floresta amazônica: Causas e soluções. Política 
Ambiental/Conservação Internacional, 8: 143–155. Retrieved from http://www.conservation.org/-
global/brasil/publicacoes/Documents/politica_ambiental_08_portugues.pdf#page=143 
Carolina Torres Graça and Decio Zylbersztajn./ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 10 (5), 2019, 516-529 
528 
Reydon, B. P. (2014). Governança de terras e a questão agrária no Brasil. In A. M. Buainain, E. Alves, J. 
M. Silveira, & Z. Navarro (Eds.), O mundo rural no Brasil do século 21, a formação de um novo 
padrão agrário e agrícola: 1182. Brasília: Embrapa. 
Robinson, B. E., Holland, M. B., and Naughton-Treves, L. (2014). Does secure land tenure save forests? A 
meta-analysis of the relationship between land tenure and tropical deforestation. Global 
Environmental Change, 29(November): 281–293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.012 
Serviço Florestal Brasileiro. (2017). Boletim SNIF 2017. Retrieved from http://www.florestal.gov.br/-
documentos/publicacoes/3230-boletim-snif-2017-ed1-final/file 
Silva, L. O. (1997). As leis agrárias e o latifúndio improdutivo. São Paulo Em Perspectiva, 11(2): 15–25. 
The World Bank LAC. (2014). Avaliação da governança fundiária no Brasil (Relatório número 88751- BR). 
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLGA/Resources/Brazil_land_governance_-
assessment_final_Portuguese.pdf 
Veracel. (2012). Relatório de sustentabilidade Veracel Celulose 2011. Eunápolis. Retrieved from 
http://www.veracel.com.br/sobre-a-veracel/relatorio-de-sustentabilidade/ 
Veracel. (2013). Relatório de sustentabilidade Veracel Celulose 2012. Eunápolis. Retrieved from 
http://www.veracel.com.br/sobre-a-veracel/relatorio-de-sustentabilidade/ 
Veracel. (2014). Relatório de Sustentabilidade Veracel Celulose 2013. Eunápolis. Retrieved from 
http://www.veracel.com.br/sobre-a-veracel/relatorio-de-sustentabilidade/ 
Zylbersztajn, D. (2010). Fragile social norms: (Un) sustainable exploration of forest products. 
International Journal on Food System Dynamics, 1(March): 46–55. Retrieved from 
http://131.220.45.179/ojs/index.php/fsd/article/view/10/9 
Carolina Torres Graça and Decio Zylbersztajn./ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 10 (5), 2019, 516-529 
529 
Appendix 
Information Source Available at 
a. Number of properties registered with 
SIGEF in July 2018 (in thousands plots) 
b. Territorial extension in hectares of the 
area registered with SIGEF in July 2018 
c. Percentage of state surface registered 
with SIGEF in July 2018  
Instituto Nacional de 
Colonização e Reforma 
Agrária (INCRA) 
http://sigef.incra.gov.br/consultar
/estatisticas/    
d. Number of Indigenous communities with 
land traditionally occupied in stages prior 
to the regularized condition in June 2018 
e. Number of indigenous communities with 
land traditionally occupied in stages prior 
to the regularized condition in June 2018 
per 10,000 hectares  
Fundação Nacional do Índio 
(FUNAI) 
http://www.funai.gov.br/index.ph
p/indios-no-brasil/terras-
indigenas  
f. Number of filled cases for demarcation 
of quilombola land by June 2018 
g. Number of filled cases for demarcation 
of quilombola land by June 2018 per 
10,000 hectares 
Instituto Nacional de 
Colonização e Reforma 
Agrária (INCRA) 
Database made available by INCRA 
in June 2018  
h. Number of land conflicts in 2017 
i. Number of land conflicts in 2017 per 
10,000 hectares  
Comissão Pastoral da Terra 
(CPT) 
https://www.cptnacional.org.br/c
omponent/jdownloads/category/4
-areas-em-conflito?Itemid=-1  
j Percentage of rural population in 2010 
 
Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE) 
https://censo2010.ibge.gov.br/sin
opse/index.php?dados=8  
k. Human Development Index (HDI) in  
2010  
Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE) 
https://cidades.ibge.gov.br/  
Federative units surface  Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE) 
https://ww2.ibge.gov.br/home/ge
ociencias/cartografia/default_terri
t_area.shtm  
 
